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UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW ONLINE
More Ways to Protect LLC Owners
and Preserve LLC Flexibility
Peter Molk*
This online companion to Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving
LLC Flexibility considers several alternative approaches that might unify
LLCs' twin goals of owner protection and governance flexibility. I examine
self-regulation, private certification, investor-led market forces, lawyers in
their gatekeeping capacity, and mandated disclosure systems. Ultimately,
each of these alternatives proves less satisfying than a system that
bifurcates LLC law based on the presumed sophistication of LLC owners.
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INTRODUCTION
In Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility,' I develop
the case for bifurcating limited liability company ("LLC") law
depending on LLC owners' projected sophistication. This bifurcation
accomplishes the incompatible twin goals of giving LLC owners
flexibility to set their internal governance rules while protecting
relatively unsophisticated owners. In this online companion, I
examine several additional ways to achieve this outcome, ultimately
concluding that each is unsatisfactory. By analyzing the potential of
self-regulation, private certification, investor-led market forces,
lawyers as gatekeepers, and disclosure regimes, I make the case that
the alternative "qualified LLC" solution developed in the
accompanying Article has the most promise for enhancing long-term
LLC efficiency.
I. SELF-REGULATION
Industry self-regulation has achieved remarkable success in a variety
of contexts. The American Bar Association ("ABA"), for example,
promulgates and enforces ethics rules to govern the legal profession,
in turn increasing the attractiveness of lawyers for clients.2 The
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") regulates the
broker-dealer industry, which protects investors and makes them
more likely to patronize FINRA-affiliated broker-dealers.3 Perhaps,
then, we could similarly rely on LLCs to police themselves through
self-regulation?
A reliance on LLC self-regulation would hope that LLCs would
monitor one another to make sure that investors had a minimum,
meaningful level of contractual protections, or that opportunism
nevertheless did not occur in spite of a lack of protections. There are
reasons to think this self-regulation might be attractive to LLCs. For
one, self-regulation could head off more intrusive government
regulation that might otherwise be enacted, preserving a
1 Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility,
51 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2129 (2018) [hereinafter Protecting LLC Owners].
2 See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, Self-Regulation, and
the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079 (2005); cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The
Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2009) (characterizing attorney
self-regulation as only one piece of a broader attorney regulatory system).
3 For analysis of FINRA's self-regulation, including skepticism about its
effectiveness, see generally Andrew F. Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2014) [hereinafter Self-Regulation].
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comparatively happy current state of affairs for existing LLCs.4 Self-
regulation could also protect the LLC "brand" from becoming
tarnished by a few rotten apples, ensuring that he organizational form
remained relatively attractive for investors' capital rather than scaring
that capital away.5 In other words, self-regulation could preserve trust
and fend off more intrusive regulation for LLCs just as it has in other
contexts.
Despite these advantages, the biggest impediment to LLC self-
regulation may be the difficulty involved in achieving effective internal
monitoring. Self-regulation requires that constituents regulate
themselves, by monitoring what the others are doing. Yet monitoring
presents a classic externalities problem. The benefits from a strong
LLC brand accrue to all LLCs, while the costs are borne
disproportionately by those LLCs actually doing the monitoring. As
with any good with positive externalities, private forces will therefore
underprovide LLC monitoring, which would lead self-regulation to
unravel.
On top of the externalities problem is the massive cost of
monitoring the more than two million LLCs currently in existence,
with more forming every day.6 These companies are diffusely spread
around the country; their operating agreements are usually nonpublic,
non-standardized, and difficult to discern;7 and their investors' and
managers' conduct is generally private. Monitoring in these
4 Jerrold G. Van Cise, Regulation - By Business or Government?, HARV. Bus. REV.
(Mar. 1966), https://hbr.org/1966/03/regulation-by-business-or-government ("It is of
course true that, with 'a little bit of luck,' industry may enjoy the happiness of self-
regulation without the harassment of any government participation whatever.").
5 See, e.g., Mary Kay Gugerty, Mark Sidel & Angela L. Bies, Introduction to
Minisymposium: Nonprofit Self-Regulation in Comparative Perspective - Themes and
Debates, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1027, 1035-36 (2010) (discussing this
incentive in the nonprofit sector).
6 See Table 8: Domestic General Partnerships, Limited Partnerships, and Limited
Liability Companies: Selected Items, by Selected Industrial Group, Tax Years 2013-2014,
IRS (April 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/14pa08.xls [hereinafter Table 8]
(over 2.4 million LLCs existing in 2014); Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King
of the Hill: An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs
Formed in the United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years
2002-2006, 15 FORDHAMJ. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010) (describing the rate of new
LLC formation).
7 Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 1, 2-3 (Mark Lowenstein & Robert Hillman eds., 2015)
("ILLC] governing instruments - which contain unique provisions that lead to ad
hoc judicial decisions interpreting specific provisions that provide no predictability in
future cases - are often poorly drafted and unclear . . . .").
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circumstances amounts to a herculean task, even without the
externalities issue.
Of course, self-regulation does work in some instances, even where
the self-regulated entities are spread out and numerous as would be
the case for LLCs. Both lawyers and broker-dealers have achieved
apparent success with self-regulation, despite their large and diffuse
numbers. They do so by delegating monitoring responsibilities to a
relatively concentrated single entity (the ABA or FINRA, respectively),
relying on that entity to do the self-regulatory work.8 But it is
important to recognize that this solution merely shifts problems
around. Who, for example, makes sure that the single monitor is
actually doing a good job? The same forces that make self-regulated
entities ineffective monitors of one another will also make them
ineffective monitors of the monitor. Indeed, some have argued that
self-regulation works among lawyers and broker-dealers only because
of the meaningful state oversight layered on top;9 without this external
oversight, some have argued self-regulation does not work well at all.10
II. PRIVATE CERTIFICATION
Closely related to self-regulation is the idea of private certification,
in which private certification groups shoulder the monitoring duties.
Proponents might point to the success that private certification
systems have achieved in solving some of self-regulation's
coordination failures and wonder if LLCs could similarly benefit from
a certification regime." Certification provides a useful signal of quality
in circumstances ranging from organic foodl2 to sustainable forestry
products.13 Perhaps a certifier could certify LLCs suitable for everyday
investors, or only sophisticated investors, providing similar value to
8 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
9 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1147 (discussing lawyers); Tuch, Self-Regulation,
supra note 3, at 170 (discussing broker-dealers).
10 See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 1150-51; Tuch, Self-Regulation, supra note 3, at
170 (discussing broker-dealers).
" See, e.g., Peter Molk, Do We Need Specialized Business Forms for Social
Enterprise?, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 13-19 (Benjamin
Means & Joseph Yockey eds., 2017) [hereinafter Specialized Business Forms]
(analyzing private certification in the context of social enterprise).
12 Becoming a Certified Operation, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., https://www.ams.usda.gov/
services/organic-certification/becoming-certified (last visited Mar. 1, 2018).
13 Why Should I Become FSC Certified?, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL,
https://ic.fsc.org/en/for-business/business-benefits/becoming-fsc-certified (last visited
Jan. 25, 2018).
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the investing public that the organic certification provides to the
eating public.
Instead of relying on market players to monitor one another as in
self-regulation, certification relies on one or more certification groups
to do the monitoring, which reduces coordination difficulties that
otherwise arise with a pure self-regulation system.14 Yet for
certification to succeed, two conditions must be satisfied: the investing
public would need to attach some additional value to the certification
mark, and the certifier needs to be trustworthy.1 5 The first of these
conditions has not yet been satisfied in the LLC-space, but perhaps
investors would appreciate the governance predictability that a
certifier's approval could offer if it only existed.16 There are reasons to
be skeptical: different LLC governance arrangements are more suited
to different types of investors, and whether investors could accurately
sort themselves into types recognized by the certifier, and therefore
whether a certification signal would provide any real value, is
questionable.
Satisfying the second condition would also be challenging. The same
forces that make self-regulation monitoring difficult will also lead to
apathetic monitoring of the certifier, and a poorly monitored certifier
risks undermining certification's value.17 Preventing some of these
breakdowns can be accomplished with creative legislative solutions.18
All require a significant investment of resources, in turn increasing the
costs of doing business as an LLC and making this solution less
attractive.
14 See Molk, Specialized Business Forms, supra note 11.
15 See id.; Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916,
936 (1998).
16 Indeed, this is often cited as one reason that investors favor the corporate form
with its mandatory protections for public investing, as opposed to less predictable
alternative entities. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 403
(4th ed. 2015) ("l]nvestors in the public capital markets typically prefer a simple
corporate structure - the entire business held by one formally incorporated entity -
and a simple capital structure: one class of common stock.").
17 See Molk, Specialized Business Forms, supra note 11, at 20; Gabriele Jahn et al.,
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool, 28 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 53, 61-63 (2005) (discussing conditions necessary for a successful
certification system). See generally Frank Partnoy, What's (Still) Wrong with Credit
Ratings?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407 (2017) (discussing the failures of credit rating
systems).
18 See, e.g., Brian Galle, Self-Regulation of Social Enterprise, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAw (Benjamin Means & Joseph Yockey eds., forthcoming
2018) (advocating random assignment of government-approved certifiers).
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III. INVESTOR-LED MARKET FORCES
Instead of counting on LLCs to solve the problem internally or
through certification, we might instead look to investors to provide
their own solution. There are two ways this might work. First, LLCs
that want to maximize the price that investors pay will be deterred
from inefficiently minimizing those investors' governance protections.
Investors are presumed to price governance protections and should
pay less money when they have poor governance protections.19
Second, LLCs that repeatedly need to raise funds from investors will
be deterred from opportunism even if operating agreements might
otherwise allow it, since mistreating investors will make raising future
funds more expensive.
Let us first consider the role of pricing governance protections. In
an efficient market, governance terms are incorporated into the price
at which investment interests are sold.20 Consequently, value-reducing
terms that permit opportunism by management will reduce the price
at which investment interests will sell. When firms raise money, they
typically want to maximize the selling price of investment interests.
Market forces, therefore, will deter them from including value-
reducing terms.
Moreover, efficient pricing also ensures that even if the operating
agreement allows for opportunism, investors originally pay a
compensatory discount for those investment interests. This effectively
eliminates their damages; they buy into a poor investment, but they
pay a low price to do so. In a robust, efficient market, LLC reform
might thus be unnecessary because of the deterrent and remedial
effects that market forces already provide.21
While there is evidence to support this argument in public capital
markets,22 there is little reason to think that market forces will provide
19 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowennent, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006) ("The mechanism by which securities are priced
'ensures that the price reflects the terms of governance and operation' offered by the
firm. If these governance terms are unfavorable, investors will discount the price they
are willing to pay for that firm's securities." (footnote omitted)).
20 Id.
21 See Mohsen Manesh, Equity in LLC Law?, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 59) (arguing that "market-based considerations a sociated with
[publicly-traded LLCs] weigh against he judicial use of equitable discretion to protect
investors").
22 See, e.g., Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254 (1977) (arguing that market forces imply
a "race to the bottom" in corporate law). See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES REGULATION (2002)
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a deterrent in the vast majority of problematic LLC waivers. Most
LLCs are not publicly traded, and instead are bought and sold among a
narrow group of private buyers.23 Privately traded interests among a
select group of individuals bear little similarity to the efficient market
characteristics of public markets; indeed, little or no trading volume
easily severs the requisite link between investment prices and
governance terms upon which a market forces solution relies.24 Once
that link has been cut, there is no longer a market check against the
problem of investors' underpricing governance interests, leaving this
fundamental LLC issue unaddressed. Consequently, while market
forces might make reform unnecessary for LLC interests that are
traded on efficient public markets,25 they will not solve the governance
problems inherent with unsophisticated investors buying interests in
private companies.
Next, let us examine the deterrent effect posed by LLCs' repeated
need to raise new funds over time from investors. This need may arise
for a variety of reasons. It is not unusual for companies to require
additional capital infusions as they expand later operations. Other
companies might be structured to have finite lifespans, after which
they must distribute their assets and raise new ones.26 Still others
might have controlling serial entrepreneurs who might want to
embark on a new venture with new funding. In any of these situations,
it is difficult to imagine a greater roadblock to raising funds than
recent mistreatment of investors. Repeat trips to the capital markets
will deter opportunism even if an operating agreement otherwise
permits undesirable behavior, giving it the potential to solve the LLC
opportunism problem.
However, this deterrent acts only upon those LLCs and
entrepreneurs who will (or think they might) actually engage in
(summarizing these arguments).
23 Compare Manesh, supra note 21, at 54 (finding approximately 150 publicly
traded LLCs or limited partnerships), with IRS, Table 8, supra note 6 (estimating 2.4
million LLCs); see also Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default
Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503, 538 (2017) [hereinafter Contracting Around
Default Statutory Protections] (finding three-quarters of a sample of privately held
LLCs to have transfer restrictions).
24 See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988) (discussing the
link between efficient securities markets and market prices).
25 Manesh, supra note 21. But see Strine & Laster, supra note 7, at 5
(recommending mandatory duties of loyalty for publicly traded LLCs and limited
partnerships).
26 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 289, 292 (2009).
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repeated funding rounds. And while this deterrent may undoubtedly
be effective in some areas - private equity is a prominent example27
- many firms have perpetual lifespans with no intention of raising
more capital and an entrepreneur with no immediate plans to start
new projects.28 For these firms, there is little reason to refrain from
opportunism, since existing investors are already locked into the firm
and cannot retroactively decrease their buy-in price.29
Finally, for repeat funding to provide a meaningful constraint,
reputations for past opportunism must also spread to potential new
investors, so that those new investors discount their buy-in price
appropriately. These signals are likely to be noisy, because what
constitutes opportunism is a fact-specific inquiry whose interpretation
likely differs across individuals. Moreover, the signals also may have
difficulty in spreading, given the large number of LLCs, the even larger
number of potential investors, and the relatively small number of
investors in any particular LLC who must be relied upon to spread the
company's reputation.30 Investor-led constraints, therefore, appear to
provide only a very partial solution to opportunism, in the context of
the very few publicly traded LLCs that exist.
IV. LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS
If LLCs or investors are not the solution, perhaps the lawyers who
draft LLC operating agreements are. If we could be sure that lawyers
27 See id. at 299 (describing the role of limited terms).
28 See Molk, Contracting Around Default Statutory Protections, supra note 23, at 545
(finding eighty-three percent of a sample of Delaware LLCs to have indefinite
lifetimes).
29 In fact, the problem may also arise even for many firms with plans to visit the
capital markets repeatedly. From a game-theoretical perspective, even a future need
for new capital will not act as a deterrent unless the firm will need to raise capital into
the indefinite future. If capital needs have a finite end point, then the rational firm (or
those who control it) will engage in opportunism after that final investment round.
Investors, anticipating this last-period opportunism, will offer a lower buy-in price for
the final investment round. The firm, anticipating this lower price, will therefore
engage in opportunism in the second-to-last investment round as well, since there is
nothing to be gained from good behavior. Investors, anticipating this, will pay less in
the second-to-last investment round. The cycle eventually unravels so that the firm
initially attracts investors at a low price and engages in opportunism after the first
funding round, with all future rounds following the same pattern. See generally
ANDREUI MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 268-82 (1995) (describing this
process of backwards induction).
30 Compare IRS, Table 8, supra note 6 (finding 2.4 million LLCs in 2014), with
Molk, Contracting Around Default Statutory Protections, supra note 23, at 520 (finding
ninety-three percent of a sample of Delaware LLCs to have twenty or fewer members).
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had the incentive to guarantee efficient protections for investors, then
lawyers might solve the problem that other forces cannot.
There is reason to be optimistic. Lawyers have conventionally
assumed the role of business law "gatekeepers" who keep certain bad
activities out of the marketplace. Securities lawyers, for example, are
thought to serve a gatekeeping role for undesirable private placement
and initial public offering sales.31 Perhaps lawyers could perform a
similar function when it comes to LLCs. After all, the core governance
document for LLCs - their operating agreement - is often drafted by
lawyers, putting them in an admirable gatekeeping position to screen
out "bad" operating agreements while allowing only "good" operating
agreements through. If lawyers faced legal liability or private financial
repercussions for sanctioning inappropriate operating agreements,
perhaps they would act as desired.
Yet there is also reason to doubt this potential solution. Others have
suggested that operating agreements are generally drafted by lawyers
representing exclusively sponsors of the LLC. 32 These lawyers owe no
duties to LLC investors, so they face no legal liability if the operating
agreements ultimately allow opportunistic conduct against investors.33
Many lawyers also face little meaningful private financial
consequences if they allow poor operating agreements. Reputations
matter when value is placed on a good reputation and reputation
spreads easily,34 such as with a limited pool of players. The securities
underwriting process, for example, thrives on players' desire to
preserve good reputations, but it features a limited pool of well-known
underwriters who must preserve their reputation for bringing good
31 See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (unregistered securities); Andrew F. Tuch,
Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1589-90, 1634-35 (2010) (describing the
role of lawyers in selling registered securities, while raising doubts about their ability
to be held legally liable for failure). See generally Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the
Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. REV. Q.
491 (2001) (discussing limitations with existing gatekeeper liability regimes).
32 Strine & Laster, supra note 7, at 2 ("IT] hese governing instruments seem to be
drafted unilaterally by the sponsors and proposed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the
investors.").
33 This is particularly true when the drafting attorneys disclose their interests in
the operating agreement. See, e.g., Second Amended and Restated Limited Liability
Company Agreement for Quorum Realty Fund IV, LLC, Art. 14, Sec. 14.1. Of course,
if minority investors were represented by attorneys who commit malpractice in
approving an operating agreement, investors might have legal actions against hose
attorneys. Malpractice, however, is a high bar; moreover, much of the opportunism
problem arises when minority investors are not represented by legal counsel.
34 See Choi, supra note 15, at 919-20.
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companies to the public among a restricted pool of repeat
sophisticated investors, to get more business in the future.35 On the
other hand, there is a diverse array of non-repeat LLC business, and a
diverse array of investors who probably know little about most lawyers
or their firms, making law firm reputation relatively unimportant to
many customers. Therefore, the firm that drafts a weak LLC operating
agreement loses little business if that operating agreement later leads
to opportunistic conduct. Unhappy investors will likely never be
dealing with that firm or lawyer again, and information about that
firm's or lawyer's role will have difficulty spreading to prospective
investors in new LLCs counseled by that firm or lawyer.36
Without imposing some new liability on lawyers, there are
insufficient deterrents for them to fill a meaningful gatekeeping role.
Nor would imposing new liability necessarily be a good idea, as it
would be difficult to identify ahead of time how to define a "bad"
operating agreement to which liability should attach.37 Other options
may, therefore, make more sense.
V. "SMARTER" DISCLOSURE
With these bottom-up approaches not working, perhaps we could
rely on a top-down government-initiated isclosure approach.38 LLCs
35 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming Debate
Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1169 (1995); Merritt B. Fox,
Regulating Public Offerings of Truly New Securities: First Principles, 66 DUKE L.J. 673,
689 (2016).
36 Cf. John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Startup Lawyering 2.0, 95 N.C. L. REV.
1403, 1417-18 (2017) (finding lawyers to serve no screening function in North
Carolina startups). This does not necessarily mean that certain law firms will not
specialize in providing "high quality" LLC operating agreements to some portion of
LLC investors, particularly for very large investments for which they could charge a
substantial premium.
37 This is particularly true given the noncontractual dynamics that many LLCs use
to deter opportunism. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 26, at 298-99 (analyzing these
dynamics in the context of private equity firms). These dynamics, of course, would
never appear in the operating agreement, and assessing their relative strength after the
fact could be fraught with hindsight problems.
38 We might also think that LLCs might derive standardized operating agreement
forms if left to their own devices, as has occurred in the venture capital space. See
Robert P. Bartlett, III, Commentary, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 47, 54-55 (2009) (describing the
origins of these documents); Coyle & Green, supra note 36, at 1412-15 (describing
the importance of these forms). But until the number of law firms working on LLC
formations reduces to a manageable number so that they can feasibly coordinate, and
until investors recognize value from uniformity, achieving standardization from the
ground up across LLCs as a whole seems unlikely. Cf. Jonathan G. Rohr, Freedom of
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already have disclosure of governance terms - as creatures of contract
law, operating agreement terms generally do not bind investors unless
those investors have access to and agree to those terms.39 But the
terms are not disclosed in an easily digestible format, varying from
agreement to agreement in documents that regularly span one
hundred pages of legalese.40 One term is typically given no priority
over another, making their relative importance difficult to identify and
assess. Given investors' finite ability to process disclosure terms,4
perhaps a system of "smarter" mandatory disclosure would better lead
investors to identify and appropriately price modifications to
traditional owner protections.
For instance, LLCs might be required to include a summary cover
page with their operating agreements, consisting of a listing of
traditional owner protections that most investors expect followed by
indications of whether and on what pages of the agreement those
Contract and the Publicly Traded Uncorporation, 14 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. (forthcoming
2018) (developing an argument for a ground-up standardization of governance terms
among publicly traded LLCs and limited partnerships). See generally Matthew
Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(studying deterrents to standardization in M&A deal contracts).
39 This is not to say that each investor must always agree to every term in the
operating agreement. However, initial investors must at least agree to the operating
agreement as a whole (explicitly by signing it, or implicitly by investing), with the
terms of those agreements disclosed to investors. Note that if an agreement does not
require unanimous consent for amendment, investors may later find themselves
subject to terms to which they did not explicitly agree. Nevertheless, these investors
would have consented to the original operating agreement, including the non-
unanimous consent requirement. See Molk, Contracting Around Default Statutory
Protections, supra note 22, at 537 (finding many LLCs to allow amendment without
unanimous consent); but see Shapiro v. Ettenson, No. 00442, slip op. at 650 (N.Y.S.
Jan. 24, 2017) (allowing LLC to adopt operating agreement without unanimous
consent two years after formation). See George S. Geis, Ex-Ante Corporate Governance,
41 J. CORP. L. 609, 612 (2016) (grappling with these latecomer losses). See generally
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1442-44 (1989) (describing non-efficiency one-time "latecomer" losses that can
arise from amending governance agreements).
40 Strine & Laster, supra note 7, at 12-13 ("A]lternative entity agreements
typically contain 90-plus pages of dense, complex, and heavily cross-referenced
legalese. To digest the contractual prose, the reader must decode multi-layered
sentences, incorporate the meaning of defined terms, and be constantly on the watch
for more specific provisions elsewhere in the agreement or language that applies
'notwithstanding anything to the contrary.' Even when language appears familiar, it
often departs subtly from the precise terms interpreted in earlier judicial opinions -
and intentionally so.")
41 See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (studying consequences from
this limited processing and attempts to manage it).
192 [Vol. 51:181
2018]More Ways to Protect LLC Owners and Preserve LLC Flexibility 193
protections are varied.42 Or, if that is too much for investors to
process, perhaps the first page of each operating agreement would be
required to have a smiley face of varying degrees of happiness,
depending on the overall strength of owner protections.43 Disclosures
of this sort would not only make investors more aware of what they
are getting into and more likely to price those investments accurately,
but also facilitate comparison-shopping by investors across potential
investments, a practice currently inhibited by today's lack of
standardization.
Yet the problems with disclosure-based solutions have been well
documented. As summarized by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider,
"[m]uch evidence suggests that people often overlook disclosures,
ignore them when they notice them, treat them perfunctorily when
they read them, forget and misinterpret much they have read, and
incorporate little of their learning into decisions."4 4 This presents a
troubling picture when applied to LLCs. LLCs' problem stems from
investors' failure to notice and value accurately governance
eliminations. While more digestible disclosure may address the failure
to notice issues (although evidence on even this is mixed45), it does
little to address investors' failure to value accurately those governance
modifications. To be sure, some investors who failed to notice
governance modifications will now value them accurately once those
modifications are brought to their attention. Yet many others will still
undervalue reductions even after they become aware of those
reductions' existence. Assessing the finer nuances of, for example, a
business opportunity waiver or indemnification agreement is no easy
42 Disclosure regulation often aims to simplify complex documents into
standardized forms that can be digested and compared by consumers. See, e.g., TILA-
RESPA Integrated Disclosure Rule Implementation, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/guidance/implementation-
guidance/tila-respa-disclosure-rule/ (last visited July 25, 2017) (collecting resources
for standardized mortgage disclosure rules). See generally Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia
A. McCoy & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial
Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1160-75 (2012)
(describing the genesis of these rules).
43 For an example of the power of smileys, see Leslie Kaufman, Utilities Turn Their
Customers Green, With Envy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/01/3 1/science/earth/3 1 compete.html (describing efforts made by several electric
utilities). There is, of course, a question of whether one smiley face standard could be
uniformly applied to all investors, who vary in their protection needs and desires. For
simplicity, I will assume that such a standard could be developed.
4 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 41, at 67.
45 Id. at 43 (summarizing several studies that suggest many individuals ignore
disclosed information).
UC Davis Law Review Online
task, even for investors who are aware of its presence. And still other
investors will ignore the governance disclosures no matter how
obvious they are to concentrate on the more salient features like
capital contribution repayments or dividend payout priorities, again
resulting in underpriced governance modifications.
Nevertheless, disclosure could still indirectly achieve its intended
effects, even if it has little direct effect on investors. In other contexts,
disclosure succeeds by making private information available to
government actors, watchdog organizations, academics, and
sophisticated players, who process this information to effect change
that ultimately affects disclosure's intended target.46 Disclosure of
insurance company practices, for example, may improve insurance
contracts for everyday consumers, even if those consumers never read
the disclosed information, because of the pressure from various
advocates who now have access to the information.47
For this solution to work for LLCs, LLC operating agreements must
be made generally available to the public. Yet most LLCs are private
entities that have strong, legitimate interests in keeping their operating
agreements private.48 Making these operating agreements publicly
available will impose significant costs. This does not mean it should
necessarily be avoided but does mean that the benefits must be
significant and that alternative approaches would not be better.
Unfortunately, there is reason to think the potential benefits from full
disclosure may be small. As already discussed, unsophisticated LLC
investors may ignore disclosure-based information, whether it comes
from the disclosure itself or indirectly through an information
processor. Further, unlike other markets, different LLC investors often
pay different prices for identical ownership interests in the same
company. This means that unsophisticated parties could be charged
one investment price by an opportunistic LLC, while sophisticated
parties, or those who pay attention to disclosure processors, are
charged a lower price, defeating the market check that processors of
disclosure have provided in other circumstances.4 9 And finally, there is
46 See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of
Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 409-13 (2014)
(discussing several successful implementations of full disclosure regimes).
47 See id.
8 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 723-37, 751-53 (1984) (discussing disclosure in
the context of securities markets); Schwarcz, supra note 46, at 401-02 (collecting
several examples). See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA.
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a less intrusive way with lower costs that could tackle the same
problem. That intervention is the subject of the corresponding
Article.50
CONCLUSION
Although a variety of alternatives exist that have successfully solved
opportunism in other contexts, these alternatives are not satisfactory
when applied to LLCs. As long as LLCs are used by both sophisticated
and unsophisticated investors and entrepreneurs, they seem destined
to either risk leaving unsophisticated investors unprotected, which
generates inefficiencies and capital costs, or risk restricting governance
flexibility, which keeps some investors from setting the optimal
internal governance rules for their unique situations.
The accompanying Article takes up a new and creative solution to
this problem.51 Instead of applying a uniform set of rules to LLCs
regardless of investor type, I propose bifurcating the system, much as
securities law has done with securities registration requirements.52
Doing so will ensure LLCs continue to be appealing and appropriate
for both the very sophisticated parties who can fend for themselves as
well as everyday investors who seek a simple tax-efficient form with
limited liability.
L. REV. 630, 643-45 (1979) (analyzing the circumstances under which a group of
informed market participants can generate efficient prices for all).
50 Molk, Protecting LLC Owners, supra note 1 (developing a "qualified LLC"
solution).
51 Id. at 2151.
52 Id. at 2159.
